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# STAFF NOTES:

# Middle East Africa South Asia

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#### MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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#### Rhodesia

#### Nationalists' Disarray

Factional rivalries among Rhodesia's black nationalists have intensified in recent months and are now a major impediment to constitutional negotiations between the blacks and Prime Minister Ian Smith's minority white regime. Bishop Muzorewa, president of the umbrella African National Council, has called off a congress that was to give the organization a permanent structure and also select new leaders to deal with Smith.

The disarray among the nationalists is made to order for Smith, who does not really want meaningful settlement talks. A prolonged impasse between Smith and the council's quarrelsome leaders is likely, eventually, to lead to a resumption of active insurgency.

The present executive committee of the council includes representatives from three outlawed guerrilla groups that merged with Muzorewa's legal organization at a meeting in Zambia last December and then agreed to a truce with Smith. The unity agreement, arranged under pressure from the presidents of Zambia and Tanzania, called for a congress to be held within four months to resolve organizational and leadership problems.

The factional infighting since December reflects not only a struggle for control of the council, but also conflicting attitudes toward a negotiated settlement with Smith. The former Zimbabwe African National Union fielded most of the guerrilla units that began operations inside Rhodesia in late 1972. Some of its units are still in place and active. National Union representatives on the council's executive committee favor a resumption of full-scale guerrilla warfare, believing it would help them to gain control of the council and thus put them in a position to inherit power when white rule ends. Accordingly, they have sought to forestall settlement talks by pressing demands that Smith is unlikely to accept.

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Leaders of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, a militarily weaker guerrilla group, also believe that the National Union might gain power through an extended liberation war. They want therefore to get on with settlement talks as quickly as possible. They also want an early organizational congress of the council, believing they will be able to dominate it; they are convinced they have a stronger following among urban blacks than their rival.

Zambian President Kaunda's roundup last March of hard-line Rhodesian insurgents based in Zambia, most of whom belonged to the National Union, seemed for a while to tip the balance within the council in favor of the moderates who were willing to negotiate with Smith. Kaunda's crackdown has in fact reduced the ability of the National Union to continue guerrilla operations, but has also motivated its representatives to try other ways of scuttling settlement talks.

The continuing power struggle has at least temporarily disrupted the cooperation that existed among several moderate factions against hardliners from the National Union. On June 1 Joshua Nkomo, principal leader of the Peoples' Union, forced a vote in the council's executive committee to hold the congress and to resume preliminary talks with Smith; his actions led to a bitter dispute and sparked extensive rioting in the streets that was quelled by police with much bloodshed. Nkomo's bid to advance his faction's interests apparently swayed Bishop Muzorewa, when he returned from an overseas trip on June 6, to join forces with Nkomo's rivals in opposition to holding the congress. On June 16, Muzorewa announced the congress had been put off indefinitely.

In response to efforts by Muzorewa to patch matters up, a leader of the National Union who had threatened to boycott further talks with Smith did in fact join the delegation that met with Smith on June 12. The meeting quickly adjourned when Smith again refused a demand that a conference take place outside Rhodesia.

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Spokesmen for the council argue that settlement talks must be held outside Rhodesia because Ndabaningi Sithole, principal leader of the council's National Union faction, would be rearrested if he returned to Rhodesia. Sithole, who is considerably more militant than Nkomo, has not flatly opposed settlement talks, but he has repeatedly declared they will prove fruitless, and that a liberation war is inevitable.

Smith seems to want to isolate the hardliners and then talk with the moderates. In his latest meeting with a delegation from the council he reportedly said he would not allow Sithole to return even temporarily to Rhodesia to participate in a conference. So far, however, Smith's repressive tactics against Sithole and other hardliners have mainly had the effect of pushing moderate leaders into gestures of solidarity with the hardliners. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

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#### Pakistan-Afghanistan

Afghan Troop Movements

Recent Afghan troop movements toward the Pakistan border illustrate the continuing possibility that a misunderstanding or overreaction could lead to serious trouble between the two countries even though both governments have lately been trying to ease tensions.


Earlier this month, Afghan President Daoud reportedly sent infantry reinforcements to a position near the border after receiving information that Pakistan had moved up army units on its side. We have seen no good evidence, however, that any unusual troop movements occurred in Pakistan.

Daoud apparently did not order his men to take any action against Pakistan, but their presence near the border conceivably could lead Islamabad to send reinforcements to the area. This would increase the chance of an incident that could grow into a serious conflict. Such developments would run counter to recent efforts by both sides to reduce the danger of major trouble between them. Although they have not eased their sharply conflicting positions on the status of Pakistan's two border provinces, they agreed late last month to tone down hostile exchanges of propaganda. So far, both sides appear to be complying with the agreement. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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